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I. It has recently been argued by Katz (1981) that theories of 
meaning .!!! ~ fail to observe the kind of competence/performance 
distinction a theory of meaning should. According to Katz, there 
is in the entire tradition of such theories (a tradition he 
glosses "Austinian") "an endemic conflation of matters of language 
with matters of language use" (Katz, 1981:218). Against this 
tradition, Katz insists that matters of language use are matters 
of performance, whereas the theory of meaning ought to be 
interested only in matters of competence. It is, on his view, 
semantic competence that must be captured by such a theory, and 
the only way this can be done is by abstracting from all aspects 
of context and use. The tradition Katz criticizes has emphasized 
the latter; its thrust has been that the context of the utterance 
of a sentence and the rules pertaining to its use are constitutive 
of that sentence's meaning in the language. It claims that 
without adverting to such rules and contexts we cannot say what 
meaning a sentence has, indeed, that it has no meaning in such a 
vacuum. On such a view, what Katz thinkS-Semantic theory needs, 
namely, "a notion of an absolutely context-free sentence meaning," 
makes no sense. 
Katz takes Searle's theory of speech acts as representative 
of this tradition and sets out to rebut the latter's recent 
challenges to this notion (Searle, 1978). In this paper I wish to 
show that while Searle and others roughly in the "meaning is use" 
tradition are indeed guilty of blurring an important 
performance/competence distinction, and to the extent to which 
they try to draw one, they do so in the wrong place, we should not 
draw the moral Katz does, namely, that use theories in principle 
cannot accommodate the kind of performance/competence distinction 
an adequate theory of meaning requires. I shall suggest a way of 
drawing that distinction which is immune to Katz's criticisms. 
II. Katz characterizes a theory of speech acts as "an account of 
semantic performance, the way a language user employs semantic 
competence and information about a speech context to determine the 
meaning of sentence tokens in the context" (Katz, 1981:215). By 
contrast, a semantic theory proper yields semantic types "which 
are the compositional meanings of sentences in the language," 
distinct from a "pragmatic theory of how semantic competence is 
related to semantic performance" (ibid.). Katz cites with 
approval Chomsky's insistence that in the study of natural • 
language we should not be interested in"··· such grammatically 
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irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts 
of attention and interest and error" (Chomsky, 1965:3). These 
matters of performance should not be confused with the so-called 
performative aspects of natural language. The latter will come 
under a theory of semantic competence: the ideal speaker-hearer's 
knowledge of the language will include knowledge--context-free 
semantic knowledge--of these performative aspects, but it will not 
derive from the actual context and features of use. Katz thinks 
that in slicing things this way we will have given a complete 
context-free compositional semantics for a natural language 
without bringing in such concepts having to do with the use of 
natural language as linguistic act, linguistic behavior,-COntext 
of utterance, background information, etc. 
The trouble with this argument is that while it rightly 
insists that we distinguish between semantic ~ and semantic 
tokens and that only the former are properly the concern of 
semantic theory, it fails to allow for an analogous distinction in 
a theory of speech acts. Surely we can, and should, distinguish 
between act-types and act-tokens, context-types and context-
tokens, even background-types and background-tokens. Once we do 
so, we can see that facts about the ~-member of each of these 
pairs can and must play a role id a theory of competence 
concerning the use of natural language and that such a theory must 
indeed be part of a theory of natural language. 
Let me elaborate on the kind of type/token distinction I am 
suggesting here in terms of speech acts; what I say will apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to contexts, backgrounds, and so on. With 
respect to any sentence of a natural language, there is a set of 
facts concerning the use of that sentence expressible in the 
following form: 
(A) The sentence type S in language L is (standardly) used 
in context-type C to perform speech-act type A. 
Contrast this with facts of the sort that can be expressed as 
follows: 
(B) A token of S has been used in circumstances 
instantiating C to perform a token of A. 
The former is a general rule; the latter the report of a 
particular speech event. Statements like (A) express rules the 
knowledge of which is partly constitutive of the ideal speaker-
hearer's knowledge of L and must thus be part of an account of his 
linguistic competence. Statements like (B) have to do with 
particular performances and as such fall outside theories of 
competence. But note that the kinds of "grammatically irrelevant 
conditions" alluded to by Chomsky, such as memory limitations, 
etc., affect only facts of the type expressed by CB). Katz is 
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right in saying that these must be ignored in constructing a 
theory of competence. But he is wrong in concluding from this 
that no fact about language use is properly a part of competence. 
Facts of the type expressed by (A) are by any reasonable criterion 
both facts about the use of language and yet essential to any 
theory of linguistic competence. Even though there is a sense in 
which these facts are about performance. they are still relevant 
to competence. Knowing them amounts to knowing the correct rules 
of performance. and that knowledge should be distinguished from 
actually using those rules no less than should knowing semantic 
rules from actually following them. Failure to follow rules. 
whether semantic in Katz's narrower sense or pragmatic. is 
susceptible to explanation in terms of performance breakdowns due 
to the semantically irrelevant conditions Chomsky talks about. 
But ruling out reference to such conditions from a theory of 
competence does not mean ruling out reference to all facts about 
language use. The study of the conditions that typically affect 
facts such as those expressed by (B) is not of direct concern to 
the theorist of language. Psychology and, very likely, 
neurophysiology will have much more to say about such performance 
breakdowns than will the linguist or the philosopher of language. 
But theories of linguistic competence will not on this account 
exclude considerations of use; they must still include a theory of 
the rules of use. 
III. There is a kind of breakdown which is of concern in the 
study of linguistic competence: one that--i-nvolves a violation of 
a rule of the sort expressed by'(A). If such a violation does 
occur (that is, if a speaker on a particular occasion attempts to 
use sentence token S in context C to perform a token not of 
speech-act.type A but of B), we regard the violator as having 
deviated from the standard of ideal competence laid down by the 
set of (A)-type rules that together define L. Since these rules 
define L, such a speaker cannot succeed in performing a speech act 
other than one (or one of the ones) specified by (A).1 
Now there is a sense in which Katz's own position shows a 
recognition that something like (A)-type rules must form part of 
any account of linguistic competence. It is only common sense 
that they should do so: what kind of linguistic competence would 
a theory that excluded a speaker's knowledge of how to use the 
sentences of his language describe? Indeed, one of the insights 
behind the arguments of use-theorists is the recognition that it 
doesn't make much sense to attribute to a speaker knowledge of 
meanings (even of the sort Katz thinks a semantic theory should be 
about) while withholding from him knowledge of rules of use. 
Could I really be said to know what the words (and assuming a 
compositionality principle, the sentences) of L mean, if I do not 
know how they are used? But to have the second kind of knowledge 
is to have knowledge of the sort (A) expresses, knowledge of rules 
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of use. Katz wants to allow performativeness as a legitimate part 
of semantic theory, but not considerations of language use. That 
is an incoherent position. Performativeness is a matter of rules 
of use, even though it is not a matter of actS-of use, of ~~ 
performances. ~~ 
Knowledge of rules of use is constitutive of being a speaker 
of L, even if following them on each and every occasion of 
speaking is not. My falling off my bicycle occasionally does not 
show that I don't know how to ride one, though if I always fell 
off, perhaps that would.2 It would show that I lack bike-riding 
competence just as consistently violating the rules of use would 
show that I don't know L. 
The analogy can be extended further. If the cause of my 
always falling off my bike were some physical limitation of mine 
(trouble with the inner ear, perhaps), rather than any unusually 
sustained sequence of such typical causes of occasionally falling 
off as drunkenness or sudden trucks or gusts of wind, we would, I 
think, say that I didn't know how to ride a bike. And this would 
be so even if I could state a correct theory of bike-riding. 
Analogously, my ability to state an entire semantic theory in 
Katz's sense (that is, to give a complete compositional account of 
the relations among all the semantic types of L) does not entail 
that I know L. We would not say that I knew L, if I could not use 
it correctly. A machine programmed only with a semantic theory in 
Katz's sense would be unable to simulate a speaker; one reason 
(though there may be others) for this would be the machine's lack 
of "knowledge" of rules of use.3 
Consider another analogy, perhaps closer to the case of 
language: competence in playing some game, say, bridge. The 
rules of the game, including the rules of bidding, are analogous 
to the kind of rule I have argued a theory of meaning for a 
natural language must capture. They include rules like 
(C) The sentence 'Two clubsl' is used in bridge-bidding to 
assume the obligation, if the bid is passed, to make 
eight tricks with clubs as trump. 
But they do not include rules constituting bidding conventions, 
such as 
(D) The utterance of ~Two clubsl' by a bidder [using the 
particular bidding convention) indicates the possession 
of a hand of a certain strength. 
Someone who understood the meaning of the word 'two' and of 
the word 'clubs', but did not know rule (C), could not be said to 
know how to play bridge. On the other hand, someone who knew 
that, but failed to know what (D) expresses, should, strictly 
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speaking, be characterized as someone who knows how to play 
bridge, even if he does not know a particular bidding convention 
(he may, of course, know some other). Even if it is urged that 
knowing some bidding convention or another is part of knowing how 
to play bridge, or at least of how to play bridge reasonably well, 
it does not follow that knowing a particular convention is. The 
important thing to see is that rules of use are not like rules of 
particular bidding conventions. They are, rather, like the 
constitutive rules of the game of bridge, such as those expressed 
in (C). Rules like (A) are analogous to those like (C): the 
former are required for knowing L, as are the latter for knowing 
how to play bridge. Both are thus constitutive of the respective 
competences involved. (A)-type rules are, in fact, semantic rules 
.P!!:_ excellence. But whether we choose to use the terms 'semantic' 
and 'means' in such a way that 'semantic competence' includes 
knowledge of such rules (as I have done) or in such a way that in 
excludes it (as Katz seems to prefer) is trivial. What matters is 
that knowing such rules is an essential part of linguistic 
competence, and that the kind of breakdowns mentioned by Chomsky, 
which Katz rightly wishes to exclude from linguistic competence, 
do not bear on it. If this is right, then we have specified a 
sense in which a theory of meaning, in order to be a theory of 
competence, must make reference to matters of use, Katz's 
arguments notwithstanding. 
IV. The question, what kind of connections obtain between 
semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning, is a complicated one. 
Continuing with our bridge analogy, a bidding convention in which 
there was no connection between the fact that whenever a 
partnership is left in two clubs it has to make eight tricks and 
the fact that 'Two clubs!' indicates a certain strength in the 
bidder's hand and invites a response dependent on the strength of 
his partner's, would admittedly not be very useful. But that is a 
fact about that convention, not about bridge-aBSUch. The 
conceptual connection of interest for understanding what bridge is 
is that between the meaning of the sentence type 'Two clubs!' and 
the rule that in bridge an utterance of a token of that sentence 
entails that if passed, the bidding partnership has to make eight 
tricks with clubs as trumps. Similarly, with a natural language, 
say English, the conceptual connection of interest to a theory of 
that language is that between the meaning of the sentence type 'I 
will meet you at eight o'clock' (a function of the meanings of the 
words 'I', 'promise', etc.) and the fact that in certain contexts 
its utterance constitutes the making of a promise. There are 
analogs of the (D)-type rules, too, in natural language: a 
performance of the act of marrying, for example (by the uttering 
of 'I will!' in the appropriate context), will have certain 
additional consequences, social, economic, practical, even 
emotional, and so will an act of stating, asserting, etc.4 Some 
of these consequences are matters of convention, others are not. 
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But none of them are constitutive of the act of marrying, any more 
than the details of a particular bidding convention are 
constitutive of the act of playing bridge. As noted before, there 
are any number of possible bidding conventions, just as there are 
any number of possible social conventions surrounding the 
institution of marriage. Some such set of conventions must always 
·be present and there may even be some constraints they must meet 
in order to be conventions of the relevant kind. In the long run, 
these conventions -- we may call them perlocutionary conventions 
-- may even feed back into and alter the conceptual connections I 
have been discussing. Nevertheless, they must be sharply 
distinguished from the latter, which constitute the activity in 
question (be that speaking L, playing bridge or getting married), 
and knowledge of which constitutes competence in that activity. 
V. Let me return to the claim I ~ade earlier, that the theory of 
use, construed as a theory of competence, must deal with types not 
with tokens. One reason for being tempted by the sort of view 
Katz advocates (though I doubt if that is his reason) is that 
theories of use often violate this constraint. Most theories of 
speech acts, especially those partially inspired by a Gricean 
conception of meaning, build into the rules of use they propose 
conditions that make mention of the actual mental states--
intentions, beliefs, expectations, etc.--of particular speakers 
for whose performance of a particular speech-act token the rules 
are taken to provide necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus a 
rule in a theory of the sort we are familiar with from Searle 
(1970) and others typically has the form 
(E) The utterance of S in C, when uttered by a speaker with 
such and such intentions, etc., constitutes the 
performance of A. 
(Sometimes C itself is specified in such a way as to include this 
additional condition; sometimes it is made a separate condition.) 
If such a rule is understood as requiring the actual presence of 
certain mental states such as intentions, beliefs, etc., on a 
particular occasion of utterance, it moves us immediately to the 
performance side of any interesting competence/performance 
distinction. It cannot be part of the meaning of S that some 
particular user of it be in some particular mental state. 
(Remember, on these theories~ the meaning of S is partially 
constituted by what A can be performed by using it.) If a use-
theory is committed to such a view, then Katz is right in 
rejecting it. 
However, use-theories need not be so committed; even if we 
think that some condition mentioning mental states relevant to the 
meaning of utterances needs to be built into a theory of natural 
language and of linguistic competence, such a condition can be 
BIRO 
stated in a way that does not commit us to any clalm about the 
mental states of particular speakers. Rules of the sort 
(F) S when uttered in C by a speaker who can be reasonably 
presumed to have such and such intentions, etc. is used 
in L to perform speech-act type A. 
will hold, even if for some idiosyncratic reason some actual 
speaker fails to have the intentions mentioned. 'Reasonably 
presumed' needs, of course, to be unpacked. But regardless of the 
details of such unpacking, what matters is that the actual 
presence in particular speakers of L of the mental states 
mentioned in the rule is not constitutive of what S means in L and 
that nothing in (F) is incompatible with the kinds of rules 
expressed by (A). Indeed, (F) can be seen as a further 
specification of (A)-type rules.5 
VI. Katz takes Searle to task for conflating truth-conditions and 
truth-values when arguing that context-free compositional meaning 
has the untoward consequence of determining"··· for every context 
whether or not an utterance of that sentence in that context is 
literally true or false." Katz is right that his theory, properly 
understood, does not commit him to such a consequence; what it 
says about the meaning of 'The cat is on the mat' is (a) that it 
is a compositional function of the meanings of 'the', 'cat', etc., 
and (b) that it is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. 
That is as it should be. Searle apparently thinks that this is 
not sufficient as a specification of the sentence's literal 
meaning, since in situations where the natural background 
assumption~ about cats, mats, gravity, up-down orientation, etc., 
fail, "the notion of the literal meaning of the sentence ••• does 
not have a clear application" (Searle, 1978:211). He appears to 
think that unless these assumptions do hold, the sentence cannot 
have "a clear set of truth conditionS" (Searle, 1978:212). But if 
this is Searle's view, he is surely mistaken. It may be that only 
against the background of such assumptions can we decide whether 
some utterance of 'The cat is on the mat' is in fact true. But it 
does not follow that we must make those assumptions to understand 
the sentence. But then neither does the absurdity Searle accuses 
Katz of, namely, that knowledge of the meaning of the sentence 
involves knowledge that the relevant set of background assumptions 
hold, and hence knowledge that the sentence itself is true. 
But Katz in turn is wrong in claiming that"··· as a use 
theorist Searle is committed to this way of thinking"-CK;t~ 
1981:220, my emphasis). If I am right in what I've argued above, 
namely, that the performance/competence distinction can be drawn 
in such a way that general rules concerning use are part of 
competence, even i~ particular facts about performances are not, 
it will be seen that such a theory of competence is at one with 
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Katz in specifying meaning without making it part of the 
specification that certain background facts actually obtain. Katz 
is right in complaining that Searle conflates truth-conditions and 
truth-values. But not every use theorist needs to do so. 
I have argued that the specification of what Katz calls the 
context-free literal meaning of the sente~ce does not require 
mention of conditions affecting performance, either like those 
Chomsky and Katz wish to exclude from semantic theory, or like 
those Searle wishes to include. But it does require the statement 
of rules concerning the connection between sentence types, context 
types and speech-act types. Thus, on the position I have been 
advocating, we can avoid the Scylla of Katz's too narrow 
conception of linguistic competence, as well as the Charybdis of 
Searle's too broad a one. We can also avoid Katz's artificially 
sharp separation of matters of language and matters of use. Then, 
the separation between semantic competence and pragmatic 
competence can be seen as artificial, too. They are really only 
abstractions from the overarching notion of linguistic competence. 
And, insofar as linguistic competence surely includes competence 
in use, a theory of language must include a theory of use.6 
NOTES 
1strictly speaking, this is true only of illocutionary acts. 
The matter is somewhat more complicated with respect to 
perlocutionary acts. However, it is plausible to think that only 
the former are relevant to a theory of meaning (Biro, 1978). 
2only perhaps, since accidental factors may be responsible 
even for such constant failure. 
3This shows up in the well-known problems of machine 
translation: when the machine yields Chinese-laundry 
translations, it is often because information of the sort 
expressed in statements of type (A) is not available to it. I am 
not suggesting that a machine could not be programmed with these 
additional rules. I see no reasoil"in principle why it could not. 
What I am insisting on here is that it would have to be, before it 
could be said to have linguistic competence. ~~ 
41t is only in Austin's early theory of performatives that 
these were sharply contrasted with constatives (Austin, 1963). In 
the later, more general, theory (Austin, 1962), performativeness 
is an aspect of all language use and a component of all -meaning. 
5There are actually two possible lines to take here, with 
importantly different theoretical consequences. The first 
concedes that the actual presence of certain mental states is 
constitutive of the performance of a token of the speech-act type 
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in question, but insists that all that is relevant ~o S's "speech-
act potential" (the expression cqmes from Alston, 1964) and thus 
to its meaning is the sort of correlation expressed in (F) among 
sentences, contexts, mental states and speech acts, all considered 
at the type level. The second line maintains that even the 
identity of speech-act tokens is independent of the actual mental 
states of speakers, being governed rather by what inferences about 
such states are warranted by publically observable features of the 
speech-act and its context. Thus the first, but not the second, 
of these positions involves accepting (E) in its present form. 
Both, however, deny that (E) is what an analysis of the meaning of 
S in L requires, while yet insisting that programatic rules of the 
sort expressed in (F) are essential to that analysis. Thus both 
positions steer a middle""course between the extremes espoused by 
Katz and Searle. 
6r wish to thank Michael Hand for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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